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REVIEW ESSAYS

the case for hard power

Dov S. Zakheim

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & the Necessity of Military Force, by Eliot A. Cohen. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
285 pages. $27.99.

Eliot Cohen’s The Big Stick is a well-crafted paean to muscular interventionism.
Its central argument is that only the United States can ensure international stability; that it can do so only if it continues to maintain the military superiority that
has enabled it to dominate international affairs since the Second World War; and
that to be credible it must be both ready and willing to employ force even when
its more narrowly defined national interests are not being challenged. The book
is neither a neoconservative nor a liberal-interventionist tract. Yet it is noteworthy that these are the only two political ideologies that essentially escape Cohen’s
critical pen.
Cohen argues that America, and only America, can preserve global order. He
recognizes that Americans are war weary; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are
well into their second decades, with no end in sight. Yet he asserts that, just as
withdrawal from either country would harm American interests seriously—he
notes that President Obama belatedly came to the same conclusion—so too
would American reluctance to go to war whenever and wherever the international order again comes under serious threat. For that
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to America’s strategic posture prior to its entry into
the First World War. It is no longer enough, he
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self-defense, even if leavened by participation in the global market and membership in the United Nations. There simply are no good alternatives to American
leadership. The kind of global order that a China or a Russia might impose, assuming that it has the ability to impose any order at all, would undermine the
values that Americans and the citizens of their allies hold most dear.
In making his case against not only neo-isolationism but the downgrading of
the centrality of force in American security policy, Cohen critiques five variations
of arguments to support a modern-day version of the posture first articulated
by George Washington in his Farewell Address. Cohen is highly skeptical of the
case put forth by Steven A. Pinker, among others, that the world is becoming a
more peaceful place and America no longer need act as the world’s policeman.
Cohen rightly points out that the trends that underlie Pinker’s calculations are
belied by the horrific number of deaths in the two world wars, in particular.
Moreover, Cohen argues that a significant reason for the decline in the number
and magnitude of wars since the end of the Second World War is the dominant,
and generally benign, influence of the United States on the international security
environment. Statecraft matters: the choices politicians make can and do mean
the difference between war and peace. As he puts it, “the deliberate action of one
state above all—the United States—has had something to do with the relative
peacefulness of the world after 1945. . . . [I]t follows that an American decision
to stop acting that way could yield a far nastier twenty-first century than the one
Pinker expects” (p. 10).
A prominent critic of the Trump administration during its first months in
office, Cohen also assails the notion—dear to both the Clinton and Obama administrations (especially the latter)—that it was the employment of soft power
that most effectively furthered American interests worldwide. Soft power is the
concept that Harvard University professor Joseph Nye developed to describe the
noncoercive ability to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness
of culture, political values, and foreign policies. Cohen does not reject the notion
of soft power entirely, but his argument is that without the availability, and at crucial times the employment, of credible hard power, soft power cannot be relied on
to protect America’s interests and those of its allies or others whom it might wish
to support. He focuses on the limits of sanctions, and offers examples to underscore his contention that soft power is not enough. Sanctions may have brought
Iran to the negotiating table, but they did not put a halt to its nuclear program.
Nor have sanctions stopped Russia from annexing Crimea or supporting Ukrainian separatists. Sanctions are indiscriminate, and often penalize a state’s innocent populace more than its guilty leaders. Once sanctions are removed—as they
were, for example, under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
better known as the Iran nuclear deal—they are almost impossible to restore.
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NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 2

2

8/7/17 11:58 AM

Zakheim: The Case for Hard Power

R E V I E W E S S AY S

127

Cohen acknowledges that sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy,
and at times are highly effective, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia being
prime examples. Given the limitations of sanctions, however, Cohen feels that
hard power needs to be mustered to assure the United States that its policy goals
will be met; in the case of Iran, he seems to call for a blockade of that country’s
shipborne commerce. He fails to examine what the Iranian reaction might be—
the very second- and third-order consequences that worry him when discussing
sanctions—or whether a blockade would involve the United States in yet another
Middle Eastern war. Nor does he outline how hard power might be applied to
prize Crimea from Vladimir Putin’s clutches.
Cohen has little time for those who argue that America should not act as the
world’s policeman simply because of its “irreducible strategic incompetence”
(p. 19). He examines several variants of their position, all of which derive from
the assertion that America’s wars since the Second World War have not been
particularly successful. For example, some argue that America’s bureaucratic
“pathologies” prevent it from exploiting American military power to its greatest
effect, while others go further and assert that American intervention is more
destructive than salutary.
Cohen rightly notes that inaction can be as dangerous as action. Moreover, not
all American wars have been failures: both the Korean War, which literally saved
South Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are very much examples to the contrary.
Cohen goes further, however. Even the Vietnam War was not, in Cohen’s view, a
complete failure, since, as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it, the war “bought time
for the rest of southeast Asia.” Cohen may go too far in seeking a silver lining for
the Iraq War. Perhaps, as he asserts, “the story is not yet fully written” (p. 21). Still,
it is a bit much to argue for the value of removing a dictator with nuclear ambitions when those ambitions were not remotely realized, and in the face of both
ongoing chaos in Iraq and Iran’s increasing domination of Iraq, to a degree that
would have been impossible had Saddam remained in power.
Cohen quickly puts paid to the argument, enunciated by President Obama,
that the United States should concentrate on “nation building at home.” He notes
that defense spending as a percentage of gross national product was considerably
lower during the Obama era than during most of the Cold War, which nevertheless witnessed major domestic initiatives ranging from Medicare and Medicaid to
the Clean Air Act. The Trump administration actually agrees with its predecessor
that one cannot acquire both guns and butter on a massive scale, but its budget
assigns a higher priority to increased defense spending at the expense of numerous domestic programs. Cohen’s advocacy of higher spending for both military
and nonmilitary programs reflects a cherished view common to all interventionists, whether of the neocon or the liberal variety. It is a policy that was enunciated
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forcefully by the liberal Democratic senator Henry M. Jackson, a consistently
strong supporter of the Vietnam War, whose acolytes include interventionists
such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Frank Gaffney, and Elliott Abrams.
Cohen reserves his most trenchant critique for so-called realists. He ascribes
to realists the view that “the world having resolved itself [after the Second World
War and the Cold War] into a more familiar pattern of competing powers, the
United States has far less need to meddle in matters abroad” (p. 11). Just as Cohen
cites Nye as the father of soft-power theory, so he cites John Mearsheimer as the
archetypal “realist.” But whereas Nye truly did conceive of the concept with which
he is associated, Mearsheimer hardly represents all, or even most, realists. After
all, Mearsheimer considers interventionist foreign policy elites to be, as Cohen
puts it, “the chief threat to the United States”—a position that actually mirrors the
“irreducible strategic incompetence” school of thought.
More characteristic of the realist position are the views, and the actions while
in office, of President George H. W. Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and
Brent Scowcroft, his assistant to the president for national security affairs (known
as the national security adviser). That team, which many consider to have constituted the most competent national security leadership since the Second World
War, was hardheaded enough to play at most a limited role as the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and, for that matter, with regard to intervening
on behalf of the Kurdish and Shia uprisings in the aftermath of the First Gulf
War. Yet it did not hesitate to mass and deploy over a half million troops to push
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, or, on a far lesser scale, to invade Panama and
spirit that country’s military dictator Manuel Noriega to Miami, where he was
sentenced to forty years in prison. Realists, pace Cohen, do believe in intervention, only that it should be far more selective than what interventionists, whether
of the neocon or liberal “responsibility to protect” variety, would prefer.
Cohen himself is inconsistent when writing about the Bush team’s policies: in
one place (p. 5) he states that the 1991 war was an example of “ample quantities”
of hard power; elsewhere (p. 32) he writes that the United States went to war
“with the strong belief that it knew the lessons of Vietnam—make wars short,
violent, conventional and end cleanly,” implying that otherwise Bush would not
have employed hard power to save Kuwait. Yet Bush and his advisers had no way
of knowing how long the war would last; in fact, they seriously overestimated
the capabilities of Iraq’s forces. They also assumed that Hussein might resort to
chemical weapons; they went ahead and attacked anyway. When Cohen then
notes that the result of that war was an “escalating military action against a still
defiant Iraq through the 1990s,” he neglects to point out that the Air Force’s
operations over both northern and southern Iraq resulted in no losses and with
monetary costs (not to mention human costs) that were a tiny fraction of those
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/9
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incurred during the 2003 war and its ongoing aftermath. Moreover, it is Cohen
himself who argues that a key element of hard power is the ongoing deployment
of forces after fighting has died down, if not ended—which is exactly what Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH were all about.
Cohen also asserts that realists consider hydrogen bombs to be “the great
equalizer of international politics” and, in effect, welcome nuclear proliferation.
This too is a mischaracterization of all but the most extreme positions on this issue. Certainly the George H. W. Bush team did not take that position, nor do the
vast majority of realist thinkers.
In Cohen’s view, “the most fundamental principle of contemporary realism[—]
. . . that all states are alike, that they have interests, and will use power to protect
and further those interests” (p. 12)—is true only to a point. He argues that “even
a slight knowledge of history” would demonstrate that Hitler was not Bismarck,
and that the reichsführer was prepared to go to far greater murderous lengths
than the Iron Chancellor ever would have contemplated. Yet this argument is
beside the point: it is the very nature of realism to recognize a threat for what it
is. The British and French in the 1930s refused to recognize the threat that Hitler
posed, not because they were realists, but because they were appeasers.
Finally, Cohen argues that “realists have trouble taking sub-state or transstate actors seriously” and fail to appreciate the intangibles, such as the power of
faith and ideology. Moreover, when he calls realists “coolly detached secularists
themselves . . . [who] find it difficult to take seriously talk of caliphates or hidden imams” (p. 13), he appears to be referring to the so-called realism of Barack
Obama, who is not, as it happens, devoid of religious instincts. Indeed, many
neoconservatives as well as liberal interventionists are themselves highly secular
and do not have the faintest idea regarding the religious motivation of people in
other parts of the world, be they substate actors or government officials.
Cohen’s critique of realists, many of whom, such as Scowcroft, opposed the
intervention in Iraq, does not mean that he views the Iraq War as an unmitigated
success. Still, even as he bemoans the American missteps in addressing the aftermath of the 2003 war, he seems to grasp at any opportunity to downplay the
effects of those missteps. Thus he posits that “behind the intent to overthrow the
regime was a desire not so much to remake the Arab world altogether, but to inflict a blow that would shock it” (p. 35). It is not at all clear that this was the case.
For some officials, the intent was indeed to remake the Arab world. For others, it
was to create a liberal democracy in Iraq, which proved to be nothing more than
a pipe dream. Cohen also argues that the cost of the war was far less than some
have estimated. He is probably correct; but nonetheless the opportunity cost of a
war that consumed at least half a trillion dollars was massive.
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Finally, while Cohen admits that waterboarding and similar techniques were
politically counterproductive, he argues that they “probably” yielded useful information. He is correct if referring to a case in which a prisoner had actionable
intelligence about a so-called ticking bomb. Yet former military officers ranging
from Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to Senator John McCain, himself a former
prisoner of war, insist that more-benign techniques would have been far more
successful and would not have violated international law—the latter a point that
Cohen does not address at all.
Ultimately, Cohen acknowledges that the Iraq War was “a mistake,” one that
cost America dearly in terms of its alliance relationships. But, having argued so
strenuously against the war’s critics, his admission seems nothing more than a
grudging concession to reality.
Turning to America’s diminishing military arsenal, Cohen argues vigorously
for a major naval and long-range aviation buildup, which would be the most effective way to deter China in particular. He also calls for accelerated modernization of the American strategic nuclear arsenal, on the grounds that nuclear weapons actually could be used. China, Iran, North Korea, and others are expanding
their arsenals; presumably they have not ruled out employing these weapons
during, or even at the start of, a conflict with an adversary.
Cohen also joins the growing call for significant reform of the Department
of Defense acquisition system. And he argues for maintaining, and therefore
funding, America’s network of overseas bases, which not only reassure allies but
ensure that conventional conflicts will not touch American shores. None of these
programmatic efforts, he argues, should come at the expense of America’s unconventional forces, which will continue to be a necessary instrument for fighting
nonstate actors such as jihadists, as well as for training friendly but less developed
forces. Indeed, his chapters on the threats that China, Russia, Iran, and jihadists
pose provide the meat of his argument for hard power and the justification for
both his policy and programmatic prescriptions.
Cohen stresses the importance of space and cyberspace, which, together with
the oceans, he terms “the commons,” all of which America is best positioned to
defend. And he strongly advocates investments to protect American interests in
all three of those domains. He also calls for American intervention in what he
labels ungoverned space, meaning states that have collapsed or are on the verge
of doing so. He recognizes that America cannot intervene in every civil war, but
seems more willing to have Washington engage in such conflicts if they take place
in the Middle East than in sub-Saharan Africa.
Cohen’s final chapter is a critique of Caspar Weinberger’s oft-repeated principles regarding the use of military force, which first were enunciated in 1984.
He challenges Weinberger’s assertion that the United States should not commit
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/9
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forces to overseas combat unless they are protecting America’s vital interests or
those of its allies. He notes that American interventions in Grenada, Bosnia,
and elsewhere hardly affected those vital interests. Indeed, it can be argued that
America should not have intervened in Bosnia, just as it did not intervene in
the far worse situations in Cambodia and Rwanda, where, since genocide was
involved, the moral imperative for intervention was much stronger. But Weinberger presided over the invasion of Grenada because American citizens were
being held hostage by a regime supported by Communist Cuba; surely, protection
of the country’s citizens is an American interest. Perhaps Weinberger’s definition
should now include “friends and partners” as well as allies, but the principle of
national interest, broadly defined—as it was with respect to Grenada—is still
sound, unless, as Cohen appears to postulate, the bar for American military intervention overseas should be considerably lower.
Cohen challenges Weinberger’s second condition for intervention, which calls
for “the clear intention of winning.” Cohen asserts that the term winning is not
as clear as Weinberger indicates. But Weinberger’s point was that the intention
should be to win; if not, what exactly should be the reason for committing American blood and treasure to an overseas adventure?
Weinberger’s third point was that America should commit forces to combat
only if the political and military objectives are clearly defined, and if there is a
clear understanding of how those forces are to achieve those objectives. In this
case, Cohen is correct that there is no way to predict the outcome of the use of
force. Still, there should be a clear sense of why those forces are being committed,
even if the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, it is arguable that Weinberger was fully
aware of the difficulty of predicting outcomes; it is evident in his fourth maxim,
that the relationship between American objectives and the forces committed to
achieving them must be reassessed continually and adjusted if necessary.
Cohen claims that Weinberger’s fifth principle, that the United States should
not commit forces to battle without “some reasonable assurance” of popular and
congressional support, “assumes too much. It is often the case that the American
people lend their support to successful enterprises and turn away from unsuccessful ones” (p. 215). Cohen misunderstands Weinberger’s intent; “reasonable
assurance” is not a guarantee. Weinberger’s point was that if there was significant
doubt that congressional and popular support would last throughout the lifetime
of the military intervention, one should question whether to launch it in the first
place.
Finally, Cohen asserts that Weinberger’s principle that committing U.S. forces
to combat should be a last resort “falls apart upon close inspection” because “one
always has the option of giving the enemy what it wants.” It is true that appeasement is an option, but Weinberger, who was hardly an appeaser, clearly did not
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see it as a viable one. Moreover, Cohen implies that the use of military force
should not be a last resort, yet throughout his volume he advocates the importance of diplomacy, which the United States presumably should employ prior
to committing forces overseas. In sum, it is not Weinberger’s principles, which
reflect the views of most realists, that are not viable; they fall apart only if one
adopts Cohen’s interventionist philosophy.
Cohen outlines six principles of his own, none of which really contradicts
Weinberger’s. His first principle is “understand your war for what it is, not what
you wish it to be”; that is, avoid rigid comparisons with previous conflicts. He is
correct, of course, but nowhere did Weinberger advocate “fighting the last war,”
or any previous kind of war, for that matter. Cohen’s second principle calls for
adaptability as a conflict progresses and its nature changes. In so doing he is echoing Weinberger’s admonition that the relationship between wartime objectives
and the forces committed to conflict calls for continual reassessment.
Cohen’s third principle is that the nation must be prepared for a long war even
if its objective is a short one. Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of clearly
defined military objectives while stressing the need for reassessing the link between forces and objectives would appear to indicate, in agreement with Cohen,
that if a war must be fought for a longer period than originally anticipated to meet
national objectives, then forces must be committed to that longer-term effort.
Weinberger’s six principles did not address Cohen’s fourth: “while engaging
in today’s fight, prepare for tomorrow’s challenge.” However, Weinberger certainly would have agreed with Cohen; the former actually coauthored (with Peter
Schweizer) an entire volume on that very subject, entitled The Next War (Regnery,
1996). Weinberger identified possible future conflict scenarios with China, North
Korea, Iran, and Russia (all of which Cohen discusses at length) and even Japan(!)
(which Cohen does not). Interestingly, the book’s introduction was written by
Margaret Thatcher, who as prime minister led her country in a successful war
that no one anticipated, the 1982 Falklands conflict, and who herself identified
yet another potential threat that Cohen addresses, that of Islamic extremists.
Weinberger also would have agreed with Cohen’s fifth principle: “adroit
strategy matters; perseverance usually matters more.” The former Secretary of
Defense simply put it differently when he asserted that “if we decide to put troops
in a combat situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.” Winning may well mean something different in the twenty-first
century than in Weinberger’s day, but if that is not the objective, why expect the
nation to persevere?
Indeed, Cohen himself refers to winning in his final principle: “a president
can launch a war; to win it, he or she must sustain congressional and popular
support.” Weinberger’s principle on this account was not really all that different:
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/9
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he simply stated that a president should not commit forces to combat “without
reasonable assurance” of popular and congressional support. As already noted,
“reasonable assurance” is not a cast-iron guarantee. It calls for constant monitoring to validate that assurance—exactly as Cohen requires.
That Cohen’s disagreements with Weinberger may be less substantive than he
feels they are should not detract from the value of his own set of principles. Indeed, the breadth of Cohen’s book is striking, and his analyses are always cogent.
Finally, agree with him or not, Cohen makes one of the strongest cases on record
for a robust interventionist policy. If for no other reason, his book should be
required reading for analysts, strategists, and policy makers when they evaluate
options for strengthening what is perceived widely as America’s currently diminished influence on the world stage.
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